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Abstract
This study explores the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a hybrid growth model in which
the economy may exhibit semi-endogenous growth or fully endogenous growth. We
consider two types of R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation and quality-
improving innovation. R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation only have ef-
fects in the fully-endogenous-growth regime, in which a higher subsidy rate leads to
an earlier activation of quality-improving innovation and increases the transitional and
steady-state growth rate. R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation have con-
trasting e¤ects in the two regimes. In the semi-endogenous-growth regime, a higher
subsidy rate on variety-expanding innovation increases transitional growth but has no
e¤ect on steady-state growth. In the fully-endogenous-growth regime, a higher sub-
sidy rate on variety-expanding innovation continues to increase short-run growth but
delays the activation of quality-improving innovation and reduces long-run growth.
Increasing R&D subsidies on variety-expanding (quality-improving) innovation makes
the semi-endogenous-growth (fully-endogenous-growth) regime more likely to emerge
in equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we provide a growth-theoretic analysis on the e¤ects of R&D subsidies. The
novelty of our analysis is that we consider a hybrid growth model in which the economy may
exhibit semi-endogenous growth or fully endogenous growth in the long run. The model is
based on Peretto (2015), who develops a Schumpeterian growth model of endogenous takeo¤.
In this model, the economy initially experiences stagnation with zero growth in output per
capita. As the market size of the economy becomes su¢ ciently large due to population
growth, the economy starts to experience innovation and growth. Although the economy
eventually experiences the development of new products (i.e., variety-expanding innovation),
it may or may not experience the quality improvement of products (i.e., quality-improving
innovation). If the economy only features variety-expanding innovation in the long run, then
the balanced growth path exhibits semi-endogenous growth. If the economy features both
variety-expanding innovation and quality-improving innovation, then the balanced growth
path exhibits fully endogenous growth. In other words, the model in Peretto (2015) nests the
semi-endogenous growth model, in which the long-run growth rate is independent of policies,
and the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model, in which the long-run growth rate
is fully endogenous, as special cases.
Within the above growth-theoretic framework, we consider two types of R&D subsidies
on variety-expanding innovation and quality-improving innovation and obtain the follow-
ing results. R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation only have e¤ects in the fully-
endogenous-growth regime, in which a higher subsidy rate leads to an earlier activation of
quality-improving innovation and increases the transitional and steady-state growth rate
of output per capita. Interestingly, R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation have
contrasting e¤ects in the semi-endogenous-growth regime and the fully-endogenous-growth
regime. Specically, if the economy is in the semi-endogenous-growth regime, then a higher
subsidy rate on variety-expanding innovation leads to a higher transitional growth rate of
output per capita but has no e¤ect on its steady-state growth rate. If the economy is in the
fully-endogenous-growth regime, then a higher subsidy rate on variety-expanding innovation
continues to have a positive e¤ect on the growth rate in the short run but leads to a later ac-
tivation of quality-improving innovation and a lower growth rate in the long run. Increasing
R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation makes the semi-endogenous-growth regime
more likely to emerge in equilibrium, whereas increasing R&D subsidies on quality-improving
innovation makes the fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge. We discuss the
intuition behind all these results in the main text.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. Romer (1990)
develops the variety-expanding R&D-based growth model in which innovation is driven by
the creation of new products. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian quality-
ladder growth model in which innovation is driven by the quality improvement of existing
products.1 Jones (1995) argues that these seminal studies feature a counterfactual scale e¤ect
of the population size on economic growth and develops the semi-endogenous growth model,
in which the steady-state growth rate is scale-invariant.2 Smulders and van de Klundert
1See also Segerstrom et al. (1990) and Grossmand and Helpman (1991a).
2See also Grossman and Helpman (1991b, p. 75-76) who anticipated the semi-endogenous growth model.
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(1995), Peretto (1998, 1999) and Howitt (1999) combine the two dimensions of innovation
and develop a second-generation Schumpeterian model with endogenous market structure
that also removes the scale e¤ect.3 This study explores the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in this
vintage of the Schumpeterian growth model and considers their di¤erent implications under
semi-endogenous growth versus fully endogenous growth.4
In the literature, other studies also explore the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in the R&D-based
growth model; see for example, Segerstrom (1998), Lin (2002), Zeng and Zhang (2007),
Impullitti (2010), Chu and Cozzi (2018), Yang (2018) and Hu, Yang and Zheng (2019).
These studies mostly focus on either variety expansion or quality improvement. Only a few
studies, such as Segerstrom (2000) and Chu, Furukawa and Ji (2016), explore the e¤ects
of R&D subsidies in the Schumpeterian growth model with both dimensions of innovation.
However, none of these studies consider how R&D subsides a¤ect the endogenous activation
of the two types of innovation.
This study also relates to the literature on endogenous takeo¤ and economic growth. In
this literature, seminal studies include Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002),
who develop unied growth theory.5 Unied growth theory shows that the quality-quantity
tradeo¤ in childrearing and human capital accumulation allow an economy to escape from the
Malthusian trap and experience economic takeo¤.6 While human capital is certainly a crucial
engine of economic growth, innovation is another important engine of growth. Therefore, we
consider the Schumpeterian growth model in Peretto (2015) in which endogenous takeo¤ is
driven by innovation. This model features both variety-expanding innovation and quality-
improving innovation. A novel contribution of our study is to incorporate R&D subsidies into
the Peretto model to explore their e¤ects on the endogenous activation of the two types of
innovation and the endogenous determination between the semi-endogenous-growth regime
and the fully-endogenous-growth regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
explores the e¤ects of R&D subsides. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider the Schumpeterian growth model with both variety-expanding innovation and
quality-improving innovation in Peretto (2015), in which endogenous growth in the number of
products gives rise to a dilution e¤ect that removes the scale e¤ect. In the model, labor is used
as a factor input for the production of nal good. Final good is consumed by households or
used as a factor input for entry, in-house R&D and the production/operation of intermediate
goods. We extend Peretto (2015) by incorporating two types of R&D subsidies into the model
3See Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Ha and Howitt (2007) for empirical evidence that supports the
second-generation Schumpeterian model.
4See also Cozzi (2017a,b) who develops a general innovation specication that may yield semi-endogenous
growth or fully endogenous growth in the long run.
5See also Jones (2001) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) for other early studies on endogenous takeo¤.
6See Galor and Mountford (2008) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) for recent studies and empirical evidence
for unied growth theory. Galor (2011) provides a comprehensive overview of unied growth theory.
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and analyzing their e¤ects on the takeo¤, transitional dynamics and the balanced growth
path of the economy.
2.1 Household
The representative household has the following utility function:
U =
Z 1
0
e ( )t ln ctdt, (1)
where ct  Ct=Lt is (per capita) consumption of nal good (numeraire) at time t, and
 > 0 is the subjective discount rate. Population grows at an exogenous rate  2 (0; ).
We normalize the initial population to unity (i.e., Lt = et). The household maximizes (1)
subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:
_at = (rt   ) at + (1  )wt   ct, (2)
where at  At=Lt is the real value of assets owned by each member of the household, and rt
is the real interest rate. Each member supplies one unit of labor to earn wt, and  2 (0; 1) is
an exogenous tax rate on labor income. Standard dynamic optimization yields the familiar
Euler equation given by
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final good
Final output Yt is produced by competitive rms. The production function is given by
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (i)

Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t
1 
di, (4)
where f; ; g 2 (0; 1). Xt (i) is the quantity of non-durable intermediate goods i 2 [0; Nt].
The productivity of Xt (i) is determined by its own quality Zt (i) and also by the average
quality of all intermediate goods Zt 
R Nt
0
Zt (j) dj=Nt, which captures technology spillovers.
The parameter  determines the private return to quality, and 1   determines the degree
of technology spillovers. The parameter 1   captures a congestion e¤ect of variety, and 
determines the social return to variety as we will show.
Prot maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for Lt and Xt (i):
Lt = (1  )Yt=wt, (5)
Xt (i) =


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Zt (i)Z
1 
t Lt=N
1 
t , (6)
where pt (i) is the price of Xt (i). Perfect competition implies that rms in this sector pay
Yt =
R Nt
0
pt (i)Xt (i) di for intermediate goods.
4
2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic rms produce di¤erentiated intermediate goods. The production process is
based on a linear technology that requires Xt (i) units of nal good to produce Xt (i) units
of intermediate good i 2 [0; Nt]. The rm in industry i also incurs Zt (i)Z1 t units of nal
good as a xed operating cost, which is increasing in the level of technology. Furthermore,
the rm devotes It (i) units of nal good to in-house R&D in order to improve the quality
of its products. The innovation process is specied as
_Zt (i) = It (i) , (7)
and the rms (before-R&D) prot ow at time t is
t (i) = [pt (i)  1]Xt (i)  Zt (i)Z1 t . (8)
The value of the monopolistic rm in industry i is
Vt (i) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z v
t
rudu

[v (i)  (1  sZ)Iv (i)] dv, (9)
where sZ 2 (0; 1) is the subsidy rate on quality-improving innovation. The monopolistic rm
maximizes (9) subject to (6), (7) and (8). We solve this dynamic optimization problem in
the proof of Lemma 1 and nd that the prot-maximizing markup ratio is 1=. Hence, the
equilibrium price is7
pt (i) = 1=. (10)
We follow previous studies to consider a symmetric equilibrium in which Zt (i) = Zt
for i 2 [0; Nt] and the size of each intermediate-good rm is identical across all industries
Xt (i) = Xt.8 We dene the following variable for the quality-adjusted rm size:
xt  Xt
Zt
. (11)
Substituting (10) into (6) and imposing symmetry yield
xt = 
2=(1 ) Lt
N1 t
, (12)
which is a state variable that determines the dynamics of the economy. In Lemma 1, we
derive the rate of return on quality-improving R&D, which is increasing in xt and sZ .
Lemma 1 The rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D is
rqt =

1  sZ
t
Zt
=

1  sZ

1  

xt   

. (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
7Alternatively, one can introduce a patent policy parameter to impose an upper bound on the equilibrium
price. See for example Chu et al. (2019) for an analysis of patent policy in the Peretto model, but they focus
on the fully-endogenous-growth regime.
8Symmetry also implies t (i) = t, It (i) = It and Vt (i) = Vt.
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2.4 Entrants
We follow the standard treatment in the literature to assume that entrants have access to
aggregate technology Zt, which in turn ensures symmetric equilibrium at any time t. A new
rm pays Xt units of nal good to develop a new variety of intermediate goods and set up
its operation.  > 0 is a cost parameter, and Xt captures the scale of the initial operation.
The asset-pricing equation implies that the rate of return on assets is
rt =
t   (1  sZ)It
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (14)
When entry is positive (i.e., _Nt > 0), the no-arbitrage condition is given by
Vt = (1  sN)Xt, (15)
where sN 2 (0; 1) is the subsidy rate on variety-expanding innovation. Substituting (7), (8),
(10), (12) and (15) into (14) yields the rate of return on entry as
ret =
1
(1  sN)

1  

  + (1  sZ)zt
xt

+
_xt
xt
+ zt, (16)
where zt  _Zt=Zt is the growth rate of aggregate quality.
2.5 Government
The government collects income tax Tt from the representative household. The amount of
tax revenue is
Tt = wtLt = (1  )Yt. (17)
The balanced-budget condition is given by
Tt = Gt + sZ
Z Nt
0
It(i)di+ sN _NtXt, (18)
where Gt is unproductive government spending. We follow Peretto (2007) to assume that
Gt changes endogenously to balance the scal budget.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fAt; Yt; Ct; Xt; It; Gtg and prices frt; wt; pt; Vtg
such that
 the household maximizes utility taking frt; wtg and the tax rate  as given;
 competitive rms produce Yt and maximize prots taking fwt; ptg as given;
 incumbents for intermediate goods produce Xt and choose fpt; Itg to maximize Vt
taking rt and the subsidy rate sZ as given;
6
 entrants make entry decisions taking Vt and the subsidy rate sN as given;
 the government balances the scal budget in (18);
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that At = NtVt; and
 the following market-clearing condition of nal good holds:
Yt = Gt + Ct +Nt (Xt + Zt + It) + _NtXt. (19)
2.7 Aggregation
Substituting (6) and (10) into (4) and imposing symmetry yield aggregate output as
Yt = 
2=(1 )Nt ZtLt. (20)
The growth rate of per capita output yt  Yt=Lt is
gt  _yt=yt = nt + zt, (21)
which is determined by the variety growth rate nt  _Nt=Nt and the quality growth rate zt.
2.8 Dynamics of the economy
The dynamics of the economy is determined by the rm size xt = 
2=(1 )Lt=N1 t . Its
initial value is x0 = 
2=(1 )=N1 0 . In the rst stage of the economy, there is neither variety
expansion nor quality improvement. At this stage, xt increases solely due to population
growth. When xt becomes su¢ ciently large, innovation occurs. The following inequality
ensures the case in which the creation of products (i.e., variety-expanding innovation) occurs
prior to the improvement of products (i.e., quality-improving innovation):9
 <
(1  sZ) [(1  ) =   (1  sN) (  ) ]
(1  sN) (  ) 

+
2 [(1  ) =   (1  sN) (  ) ]
1  2 [1=   (1  sN) (  ) ]   (1  )

.
(22)
Variety-expanding innovation happens (i.e., nt > 0) when xt reaches the rst threshold xN :
xN  
(1  )=   (  )(1  sN) , (23)
which is decreasing in sN . Then, quality-improving innovation also happens (i.e., zt > 0) if
the rm size xt reaches the second threshold xZ dened as
xZ = arg
x
solve

1  

x  


1  sZ  

(1  sN) x

= (1  ) (  ) + 

, (24)
which is decreasing in sZ and increasing in sN . The inequality in (22) implies xN < xZ .
9Peretto (2015) shows that if quality-improving innovation occurs before variety-expanding innovation,
then the model features both types of innovation in the long run and never exhibits semi-endogenous growth.
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The rm size xt must eventually reach xN , at which point variety-expanding innovation
occurs. However, xt may or may not reach xZ . If xt never reaches xZ , then the econ-
omy features only variety-expanding innovation and exhibits semi-endogenous growth in the
long run as we will show in the next section. If xt reaches xZ , then the economy features
quality-improving innovation in addition to variety-expanding innovation and exhibits fully
endogenous growth in the long run. The following proposition adapted from Peretto (2015)
summarizes the dynamics of xt.
Proposition 1 Suppose the initial condition of the economy satises10
= (1  ) < x0 < xN
and the following inequality holds:11
min

1  
(1  sN)  ;

1  sZ

>
1
1  

+

1  

. (25)
If xZ  x, then the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt =

xt > 0 x0  xt  xN
v (x   xt)  0 xN < xt  x , (26)
where
v =
1  
(1  sN) 

1  

  (1  sN) 

+

1  

,
x  
(1  ) =   (1  sN) [+ = (1  )] .
If xZ < x,12 then the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt =
8<:
xt > 0 x0  xt  xN
v (x   xt) > 0 xN < xt  xZ
v (x   xt)  0 xZ < xt  x
, (27)
where
v =
1  
(1  sN) 

(1  ) 1  

  (1  sN) 

+

1  

,
x =
(1  )  (1  sZ) (+ = (1  ))
(1  ) (1  ) =   (1  sN)  (+ = (1  )) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
10The inequality x0 > = (1  ) implies that 0 > 0.
11Together with the initial condition, the inequality in (25) ensures that xN 2 (0; x), where x is the
steady-state value of xt under the semi-endogenous-growth regime.
12Together with (22), (25) and the initial condition, this inequality implies that 0 < xN < xZ < x < x.
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3 E¤ects of R&D subsidies
In this section, we explore the di¤erent e¤ects of R&D subsidies under the two growth
regimes. First, we consider the semi-endogenous-growth regime (i.e., xZ  x). Then, we
consider the fully-endogenous-growth regime (i.e., xZ < x). Finally, we consider how R&D
subsidies determine which growth regime emerges in equilibrium.
3.1 Semi-endogenous growth
When the market size of the economy is not large enough (i.e., xt  xN), there are insu¢ cient
incentives for rms to develop new products. In this case, output per capita is
yt = 
2=(1 )N0 Z0, (28)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = 0. At this stage, an increase in the subsidy rate sN on
variety-expanding innovation a¤ects neither the level of output per capita nor its growth rate.
However, it leads to an earlier takeo¤ by decreasing xN , so that xt crosses this threshold at
an earlier time. Intuitively, a higher subsidy rate sN increases the return ret to entry in (16),
and hence, a smaller rm size xt is required for variety-expanding innovation to occur.
When the market size becomes su¢ ciently large (i.e., xt > xN), the economy experiences
variety-expanding innovation. In this case output per capita is
yt = 
2=(1 )Nt Z0, (29)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt. In the Appendix, we show that whenever nt > 0, the
consumption-output ratio ct=yt always jumps to a steady state. Therefore, we can substitute
ret in (16) into the Euler equation rt = + gt = +nt in (3) and also use (12) to derive the
variety growth rate as
nt =
1
(1  sN)

1  

  
xt

+   , (30)
which is increasing in the subsidy rate sN for a given level of xt. Intuitively, a higher subsidy
rate sN increases the return ret to entry and increases the variety growth rate.
In the semi-endogenous-growth regime (i.e., xZ  x), the economy never experiences
quality-improving innovation because the rm size xt reaches its steady state at x and
stops growing. In this case, the economy only experiences variety-expanding innovation
even in the long run. Substituting (12) into (30) yields
_Nt
Nt
=
1
(1  sN)

1  

  N
1 
t
2=(1 )Lt

+   , (31)
which shows that the growth rate of Nt is decreasing in the level of Nt as in the semi-
endogenous growth model in Jones (1995). When the economy reaches the balanced growth
path, the ratio N1 t =Lt becomes stationary. In this case, the steady-state variety growth
rate is n = =(1   ), which in turn determines the steady-state growth rate g = n
9
that is independent of sN . A higher subsidy rate sN on variety-expanding innovation instead
increases the balanced growth path of Nt given by
Nt =

2=(1 )
Lt
x
1=(1 )
, (32)
where
x =

(1  ) =   (1  sN) [+ = (1  )] , (33)
which is obtained by setting nt in (30) to n = =(1   ). Equation (33) shows that x is
decreasing in sN . These e¤ects of R&D subsidies are quite common in the semi-endogenous
growth model; see for example Segerstrom (1998).
Proposition 2 summarizes the e¤ects of R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation
in the semi-endogenous-growth regime. Figure 1 shows that an increase in the subsidy rate
sN on variety-expanding innovation leads to an earlier takeo¤ of the economy and a higher
transitional growth rate before converging to the steady-state growth rate g = =(1  ),
which is independent of sN .13
Proposition 2 In the semi-endogenous-growth regime, an increase in the subsidy rate sN
on variety-expanding innovation has the following e¤ects. When xt  xN , it has no e¤ect on
the level of output per capita and its growth rate; however, it leads to an earlier activation of
variety-expanding innovation. When xt 2 (xN ; x), it leads to a higher growth rate gt = nt
for a given xt. When xt = x, it has no e¤ect on the steady-state growth rate g = =(1 )
but increases the balanced growth path of Nt.
Proof. Use (28) to show that yt and gt are independent of sN when xt  xN . Use (23) to
show that xN is decreasing in sN . Use (30) to show that gt = nt is increasing in sN for a
given xt when xt 2 (xN ; x). Use (32) and (33) to show that Nt is increasing in sN when
xt = x
.
Figure 1: E¤ects of sN under semi-endogenous growth
13TN is the time when variety-expanding innovation is activated.
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As for R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation, they have no e¤ect on the econ-
omy. The reason is that quality-improving innovation is never activated in the semi-endogenous-
growth regime. However, they may make the semi-endogenous-growth regime less likely and
the fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge in equilibrium as we will show in
Section 3.3.
3.2 Fully endogenous growth
In the fully-endogenous-growth regime (i.e., xZ < x), the economy eventually experiences
quality-improving innovation. At this stage, output per capita is
yt = 
2=(1 )Nt Zt, (34)
and the growth rate of yt is gt = nt + zt. An increase in the subsidy rate sZ on quality-
improving innovation leads to an earlier activation of quality-improving innovation by de-
creasing xZ , so that xt crosses this threshold at an earlier time. Intuitively, a higher subsidy
rate sZ increases the return r
q
t to quality improvement in (13), in which case a smaller rm
size xt is required for quality-improving innovation to occur.
When quality-improving innovation is activated in the economy, we can substitute rqt in
(13) into the Euler equation rt =  + gt =  + nt + zt in (3) to derive the quality-growth
rate as
zt =

1  sZ

1  

xt   

    nt. (35)
Equation (35) shows that for a given level of xt, the equilibrium growth rate gt = nt + zt =
rqt    is independent of the variety growth rate nt and the variety subsidy rate sN but
increasing in the quality subsidy rate sZ . Intuitively, a higher subsidy rate sZ increases the
return rqt to quality improvement and leads to a higher rate of quality-improving innovation.
14
In the long run, xt converges to x. Then, the steady-state quality growth rate is
z =

1  sZ

1  

x   

    n, (36)
where n = =(1  ) and
x =
(1  )  (1  sZ) [+ = (1  )]
(1  ) (1  ) =   (1  sN)  [+ = (1  )] , (37)
which is decreasing in the subsidy rate sN on variety-improving innovation. Intuitively,
raising R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation increases the number of products,
which in turn reduces the market size of each product. This smaller rm size x decreases
the incentives for quality-improving innovation and the steady-state equilibrium growth rate
g = n+z.15 This result generalizes the result in Chu et al. (2016), who assume zero social
14The equilibrium growth rate is also given by gt = ret   , but ret depends on zt as (16) shows.
15See Peretto and Connolly (2007) for a discussion on why quality improvement must be the main engine
of innovation in the long run.
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return to variety (i.e.,  = 0). In contrast, R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation
continue to have a positive e¤ect on quality-improving innovation z and the steady-state
equilibrium growth rate g.
Proposition 3 summarizes the e¤ects of R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation
in the fully-endogenous-growth regime. Figure 2 shows that an increase in the subsidy rate
sN on variety-expanding innovation leads to an earlier takeo¤ of the economy but a lower
growth rate in the long run.16
Proposition 3 In the fully-endogenous-growth regime, an increase in the subsidy rate sN
on variety-expanding innovation has the following e¤ects. When xt  xN , it has no e¤ect on
the level of output per capita and its growth rate; however, it leads to an earlier activation of
variety-expanding innovation. When xt 2 (xN ; xZ ], it leads to a higher growth rate gt = nt
for a given xt. When xt 2 (xZ ; x), it does not a¤ect the growth rate gt = nt + zt for a
given xt. When xt = x, it lowers the steady-state growth rate g by reducing x.
Proof. Use (28) to show that yt and gt are independent of sN when xt  xN . Use (23) to
show that xN is decreasing in sN . Use (30) to show that gt = nt is increasing in sN for a
given xt when xt 2 (xN ; xZ ]. Use (35) to show that gt = nt + zt is independent of sN for a
given xt when xt 2 (xZ ; x). Use (36) and (37) to show that g = n + z is decreasing in
sN when xt = x.
Figure 2: E¤ects of sN under fully endogenous growth
Proposition 4 summarizes the e¤ects of R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation
in the fully-endogenous-growth regime. Figure 3 shows that an increase in the subsidy rate
sZ leads to an earlier activation of quality-improving innovation in the economy and a higher
growth rate in the long run.
16TZ (TN ) is the time when quality-improving (variety-expanding) innovation is activated.
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Proposition 4 In the fully-endogenous-growth regime, an increase in the subsidy rate sZ on
quality-improving innovation has the following e¤ects. When xt  xN , it has no e¤ect on the
level of output per capita and its growth rate; furthermore, it does not a¤ect the activation
date of variety-expanding innovation. When xt 2 (xN ; xZ ], it does not a¤ect the growth
rate gt = nt for a given xt; however, it leads to an earlier activation of quality-improving
innovation. When xt 2 (xZ ; x), it increases the growth rate gt = nt + zt for a given xt.
When xt = x, it raises the steady-state growth rate g by increasing z.
Proof. Use (28) to show that yt and gt are independent of sZ when xt  xN . Use (23) to
show that xN is independent of sZ . Use (30) to show that gt = nt is independent of sZ for
a given xt when xt 2 (xN ; xZ ]. Use (24) to show that xZ is decreasing in sZ . Use (35) to
show that gt = nt + zt is increasing in sZ for a given xt when xt 2 (xZ ; x). Use (36) and
(37) to show that g = n + z is increasing in sZ when xt = x.
Figure 3: E¤ects of sZ under fully endogenous growth
3.3 Endogenous switching between the growth regimes
Whether the semi-endogenous-growth regime or the fully-endogenous-growth regime emerges
in equilibrium depends on the relative value of xZ and x. Specically, if xZ  x, then
the semi-endogenous-growth regime emerges in equilibrium. If xZ < x, then the fully-
endogenous-growth regime emerges in equilibrium. Therefore, an increase in xZ=x makes
the semi-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge in equilibrium, whereas a decrease
in xZ=x makes the fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge in equilibrium.
An increase in the subsidy rate sZ on quality-improving innovation reduces xZ but does
not a¤ect x. Therefore, increasing R&D subsidies on quality-improving innovation makes
the fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge in equilibrium. Intuitively, the
fully-endogenous-growth regime depends on the presence of quality-improving innovation.
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Therefore, an increase in the subsidy rate sZ that raises the return to quality-improving
innovation makes the fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge.
An increase in the subsidy rate sN on variety-expanding innovation reduces x and raises
xZ . Therefore, increasing R&D subsidies on variety-expanding innovation makes the semi-
endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge. Intuitively, the semi-endogenous-growth
regime depends on the absence of quality-improving innovation. Therefore, an increase in the
subsidy rate sN that raises the return to variety-expanding innovation ends up crowding out
resources for quality-improving innovation and making the semi-endogenous-growth regime
more likely to emerge. Proposition 5 summarizes these results.
Proposition 5 An increase in the subsidy rate on quality-improving innovation makes the
fully-endogenous-growth regime more likely to emerge in equilibrium. An increase in the
subsidy rate on variety-expanding innovation makes the semi-endogenous-growth regime more
likely to emerge in equilibrium.
Proof. One can use (24) and (33) to show that xZ < x can be expressed as

1  sZ >
1  
(1  sN)   

+

1  

,
which is equivalent to z > 0 in (36). This inequality holds if and only if sZ is su¢ ciently
large or sN is su¢ ciently small.
4 Conclusion
This study explores the e¤ects of R&D subsidies in a hybrid growth model that may exhibit
semi-endogenous growth or fully endogenous growth in equilibrium. Whether the semi-
endogenous-growth regime or the fully-endogenous-growth regime emerges in equilibrium is
endogenously determined. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we obtain the follow-
ing novel results. First, R&D subsidies have di¤erent e¤ects on the endogenous activation
of variety-expanding innovation and that of quality-improving innovation. Second, R&D
subsidies have di¤erent e¤ects on economic growth in the semi-endogenous-growth regime
and in the fully-endogenous-growth regime. Finally, R&D subsidies determine which growth
regime emerges in equilibrium. Therefore, previous studies that restrict their analysis to
either growth regime may not capture the complete e¤ects of R&D subsidies.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The current-value Hamiltonian for monopolistic rm i is
Ht (i) = t (i)  (1  sZ)It (i) + t (i) _Zt (i) , (A1)
where t (i) is the multiplier on _Zt (i) = It (i). Substituting (6)-(8) into (A1), we can derive
@Ht (i)
@pt (i)
= 0) @t (i)
@pt (i)
= 0, (A2)
@Ht (i)
@It (i)
= 0) t (i) = 1  sZ , (A3)
@Ht (i)
@Zt (i)
= 
(
[pt (i)  1]


pt (i)
1=(1 )
Lt
N1 t
  
)
Z 1t (i)Z
1 
t = rtt (i)  _t (i) . (A4)
First, @t (i) =@pt (i) = 0 in (A2) yields
pt (i) = 1=. (A5)
Then, substituting (A3), (A5) and (12) into (A4) and imposing symmetry yield
rqt =

1  sZ
t
Zt
=

1  sZ

1  

xt   

, (A6)
which is the rate of return on quality-improving in-house R&D.
Before we prove Proposition 1, we rst derive the dynamics of the consumption-output
ratio Ct=Yt when nt > 0.
Lemma 2 When nt > 0, the consumption-output ratio always jumps to
Ct=Yt = (1  sN) (  ) 2 + (1  ) (1  ) . (A7)
Proof. The total value of assets owned by the household is
At = NtVt. (A8)
When nt > 0, the no-arbitrage condition for entry in (15) holds. Then, substituting (15)
and XtNt = 
2Yt into (A8) yields
At = Nt (1  sN) Xt = (1  sN) 2Yt, (A9)
which implies that the asset-output ratio At=Yt is constant. Substituting (A9), (2), (3) and
(5) into _At=At = _at=at +  yields
:
Y t
Yt
=
:
At
At
= rt + (1  ) wtLt
At
  Ct
At
(A10)
= +
:
Ct
Ct
  + (1  ) (1  )
(1  sN) 2
  1
(1  sN) 2
Ct
Yt
,
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which can be rearranged as
:
Ct
Ct
 
:
Y t
Yt
=
1
(1  sN) 2
Ct
Yt
  (1  ) (1  )
(1  sN) 2
  (  ) . (A11)
Therefore, the dynamics of Ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability, such that Ct=Yt
jumps to its steady-state value in (A7).
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (12), we can derive the growth rate of xt as
_xt
xt
=   (1  )nt. (A12)
When x0  xt  xN , we have nt = 0 and zt = 0. In this case, the dynamics of xt is given by
_xt = xt. (A13)
When xN < xt  xZ , we have nt > 0 and zt = 0. In this case, Lemma 2 implies that
Ct=Yt is constant and _ct=ct = _yt=yt. Therefore, we can substitute ret in (16) and (A12) into
rt = + nt in (3) to obtain (30). Substituting (30) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
:
xt =
1  
(1  sN) 

 

1  

  (1  sN) 

+

1  

xt

. (A14)
Dening v  1 
(1 sN )

1 

  (1  sN) 
 
+ 
1 

and x  
(1 )= (1 sN )[+=(1 )] , we
can express (A14) as
_xt = v(x
   xt). (A15)
If x < xZ , then xt reaches its steady state at xt = x.
However, it is also possible for xZ < x. In this case, when xt > xZ , we have nt > 0 and
zt > 0. Given nt > 0, Ct=Yt is constant, and _ct=ct = _yt=yt. Then, substituting ret in (16) and
(A12) into rt = + nt + zt in (3) yields
nt =
1
(1  sN) 

1  

  + (1  sZ) zt
xt

  + . (A16)
We substitute (35) into (A16) to derive
nt =
[(1  ) (1  ) =   (1  sN) (  ) ]xt   (1  )+ (1  sZ) 
(1  sN) xt   (1  sZ) . (A17)
Substituting (A17) into (A12) yields the dynamics of xt as
_xt = v (x
   xt) , (A18)
where
v  1  
(1  sN)    (1  sZ)=xt

(1  ) 1  

  (1  sN) 

+

1  

(A19)
and x is in (37). Finally, we approximate (1  sZ)=xt = 0 for xt > xZ , so v becomes a
constant.
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